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1. Introduction 
Depending on design and operational characteristics of a nuclear power plant (NPP), 
operating experience worldwide has shown that fire can be a safety significant hazard. 
Thus, the regulators expect the licensees to justify their arrangements for identifying how 
fires can occur and spread, assessing the vulnerability of plant equipment and structures, 
determining how the safe operation of a plant is affected, and introducing measures to 
prevent a fire hazard from developing and propagating as well as to mitigate its effects.  
Methods to analyze existing plants systematically regarding the adequacy of the 
implemented fire protection features can be deterministic as well as probabilistic ones. Fire 
risk assessment has become an integral part of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and, on 
an international level, fires have been recognized as one major contributor to the risk of NPP 
depending on the plant specific fire protection concept.  
Operating NPP in Germany have been designed and constructed in different plant 
generations resulting in differences in the design and layout of fire protection features. 
However, as a result of permanent supervision and specific fire safety reviews, 
comprehensive backfitting and upgrading measures have been realized including passive, 
mainly structural means (e.g. fire barriers) as well as active fire detection and extinguishing 
features and operational fire protection means (for manual fire fighting) resulting in 
significant improvements in fire safety, in particular of nuclear power plants built to earlier 
standards. 
In the past, most of the engineering work in designing NPP fire protection features has been 
performed on a deterministic basis. Moreover, the use of deterministic fire analysis is 
current practice in Germany to review the fire protection status of operating NPP.  
As an observation from other areas, the probabilistic approach provides different insights 
into design and availability of systems and components supplementing the results from 
deterministic analyses and enhances the understanding of fire risk compared to the 
consideration of deterministic analysis. Thus, probabilistic aspects have been taken into 
account for decision making on a case-by-case basis for fire protection aspects, too. A more 
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comprehensive fire risk assessment is recommended in the frame of periodic safety reviews 
(PSR) which are now a common tool in nearly all countries. 
 
2. Deterministic Safety Status Analysis 
Fire safety is already addressed in the safety criterion 2.7 “Fire and Explosion Protection” of 
the Safety Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants (BMI, 1977) and in the Incident Guidelines 
(BMI, 1994) requiring that protective measures against fires shall be taken by means of plant 
engineering. The specifications of these precautions are outlined in three nuclear safety 
standards defining and prescribing the basic requirements, fire safety measures regarding 
structural plant components, fire safety measures for mechanical and electrical plant 
components (KTA, 2000). The basic requirements describe the design principles, structural 
and equipment-related fire protection measures against building internal and external fires, 
operational fire protection measures as well as tests and inspections. 
Part 2 covers location and accessibility of buildings, fire compartments, structural elements 
enclosing fire compartments, structural elements for rescue routes, ventilation systems as 
well as heat and smoke removal systems, cable ducts, cable support structures including 
mounting elements in the vicinity of cable fire shields. Moreover, a simplified validation 
procedure for determining the required fire resistance rating of structure-related fire 
protection measures. The German nuclear safety standards on fire protection are currently 
under revision.  
The plant internal hazard fire has to be considered in the deterministic safety status analysis 
as part of the PSR in order to review if the protection goal oriented requirements outlined in 
the regulatory framework are met, but also more recent, corroborated findings are resolved, 
i.e. if the nuclear protection goals such as reactivity control and fuel element cooling are 
achieved by the fire protection features implemented. 
 
3. Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
For performing the PSR, a PSA Guide which has been issued in Germany by the regulatory 
body containing reference listings of initiating events for NPP with PWR and BWR 
respectively, which must be checked plant specifically with respect to applicability and 
completeness. Plant internal fires are included in these listings. Detailed instructions for the 
analysis of plant internal fires, fire frequencies and unavailability of fire detection and alarm 
features as well as data, e.g. on the reliability of active and passive fire protection means, are 
provided in the technical documents on PSA methods (FAK PSA, 2005a) and PSA data (FAK 
PSA, 2005b). These technical documents have been developed by a working group of 
technical experts from nuclear industry, research centres, universities, authorities and 
technical support organizations chaired by the BfS (Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, Federal 
Office for Radiation Protection).  
At present, it is international practice to perform a Fire PSA as part and supplement of the 
internal events PSA (EPRI, 2005; ANS, 2007). However, up to the time being probabilistic 
fire risk analysis (Fire PSA) is a methodology needing further development.  
A Fire PSA is required in the German PSA Guide as explained earlier. In this context, a 
state-of-the-art approach for performing Fire PSA has been developed in Germany, which 
 
has been exemplarily and completely applied to a German NPP with boiling water reactor 
(BWR) of the type BWR-69 for full power (FP) operation (von Linden et al., 2005). 
It is the task of a Fire PSA to determine the annual frequency of fire induced core damage 
states (FCDF) of a NPP within the in advance defined global analysis boundary. The set of 
all compartments is the starting point of the fire analysis. The spatial plant partitioning 
should be performed in a way that all compartments characterize the global analysis 
boundary and that the compartments do not overlap. In this case, the annual frequency of 
fire induced core damage states of the plant results from the sum of all compartment related 
annual frequencies of fire induced core damage states.  
It is assumed that compartments with a low fire load density do not impact the Fire PSA 
result. Such compartments are screened out before starting the detailed compartment and 
scenario specific analysis. The fire induced core damage frequencies of all the remaining 
compartments are determined in a first step using simplified and conservative assumptions. 
In the following, only such compartments must be analyzed in detail, for which in case of 
fire a relevant contribution to the FCDF of the whole plant is to be expected. 
 
3.1. General approach for fire PSA 
A comprehensive Level 1 Fire PSA has to be performed for power operation as well as 
shutdown plant modes. For the analysis, it is assumed that the plant contains n disjoint 
spatial units (so-called compartments) for the plant operational states mentioned in Table 1. 
The Level 1 Fire PSA aims on estimating the frequencies of fire induced damage states (in 
the most cases hazard states or core damage states) per reactor year (ry). The total FCDF is 
the result of adding up the FCDF for the entire compartments and plant modes including 
full power (FP) as well as low power (LP) and shutdown (SD) states.   
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Table 1. Denominations of the fire induced core damage state frequencies per compartment 
and plant operational state (Röwekamp et al., 2010)  
 
For estimating the overall plant FCDF (for the entire plant) the individual frequencies for 
each compartment i (i = 1, …, n) and each plant mode j (j = 1, …, m) have to be calculated. 
For minimizing this effort, a stepwise approach is chosen. If a screening approach provides 
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comprehensive fire risk assessment is recommended in the frame of periodic safety reviews 
(PSR) which are now a common tool in nearly all countries. 
 
2. Deterministic Safety Status Analysis 
Fire safety is already addressed in the safety criterion 2.7 “Fire and Explosion Protection” of 
the Safety Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants (BMI, 1977) and in the Incident Guidelines 
(BMI, 1994) requiring that protective measures against fires shall be taken by means of plant 
engineering. The specifications of these precautions are outlined in three nuclear safety 
standards defining and prescribing the basic requirements, fire safety measures regarding 
structural plant components, fire safety measures for mechanical and electrical plant 
components (KTA, 2000). The basic requirements describe the design principles, structural 
and equipment-related fire protection measures against building internal and external fires, 
operational fire protection measures as well as tests and inspections. 
Part 2 covers location and accessibility of buildings, fire compartments, structural elements 
enclosing fire compartments, structural elements for rescue routes, ventilation systems as 
well as heat and smoke removal systems, cable ducts, cable support structures including 
mounting elements in the vicinity of cable fire shields. Moreover, a simplified validation 
procedure for determining the required fire resistance rating of structure-related fire 
protection measures. The German nuclear safety standards on fire protection are currently 
under revision.  
The plant internal hazard fire has to be considered in the deterministic safety status analysis 
as part of the PSR in order to review if the protection goal oriented requirements outlined in 
the regulatory framework are met, but also more recent, corroborated findings are resolved, 
i.e. if the nuclear protection goals such as reactivity control and fuel element cooling are 
achieved by the fire protection features implemented. 
 
3. Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
For performing the PSR, a PSA Guide which has been issued in Germany by the regulatory 
body containing reference listings of initiating events for NPP with PWR and BWR 
respectively, which must be checked plant specifically with respect to applicability and 
completeness. Plant internal fires are included in these listings. Detailed instructions for the 
analysis of plant internal fires, fire frequencies and unavailability of fire detection and alarm 
features as well as data, e.g. on the reliability of active and passive fire protection means, are 
provided in the technical documents on PSA methods (FAK PSA, 2005a) and PSA data (FAK 
PSA, 2005b). These technical documents have been developed by a working group of 
technical experts from nuclear industry, research centres, universities, authorities and 
technical support organizations chaired by the BfS (Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, Federal 
Office for Radiation Protection).  
At present, it is international practice to perform a Fire PSA as part and supplement of the 
internal events PSA (EPRI, 2005; ANS, 2007). However, up to the time being probabilistic 
fire risk analysis (Fire PSA) is a methodology needing further development.  
A Fire PSA is required in the German PSA Guide as explained earlier. In this context, a 
state-of-the-art approach for performing Fire PSA has been developed in Germany, which 
 
has been exemplarily and completely applied to a German NPP with boiling water reactor 
(BWR) of the type BWR-69 for full power (FP) operation (von Linden et al., 2005). 
It is the task of a Fire PSA to determine the annual frequency of fire induced core damage 
states (FCDF) of a NPP within the in advance defined global analysis boundary. The set of 
all compartments is the starting point of the fire analysis. The spatial plant partitioning 
should be performed in a way that all compartments characterize the global analysis 
boundary and that the compartments do not overlap. In this case, the annual frequency of 
fire induced core damage states of the plant results from the sum of all compartment related 
annual frequencies of fire induced core damage states.  
It is assumed that compartments with a low fire load density do not impact the Fire PSA 
result. Such compartments are screened out before starting the detailed compartment and 
scenario specific analysis. The fire induced core damage frequencies of all the remaining 
compartments are determined in a first step using simplified and conservative assumptions. 
In the following, only such compartments must be analyzed in detail, for which in case of 
fire a relevant contribution to the FCDF of the whole plant is to be expected. 
 
3.1. General approach for fire PSA 
A comprehensive Level 1 Fire PSA has to be performed for power operation as well as 
shutdown plant modes. For the analysis, it is assumed that the plant contains n disjoint 
spatial units (so-called compartments) for the plant operational states mentioned in Table 1. 
The Level 1 Fire PSA aims on estimating the frequencies of fire induced damage states (in 
the most cases hazard states or core damage states) per reactor year (ry). The total FCDF is 
the result of adding up the FCDF for the entire compartments and plant modes including 
full power (FP) as well as low power (LP) and shutdown (SD) states.   
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Table 1. Denominations of the fire induced core damage state frequencies per compartment 
and plant operational state (Röwekamp et al., 2010)  
 
For estimating the overall plant FCDF (for the entire plant) the individual frequencies for 
each compartment i (i = 1, …, n) and each plant mode j (j = 1, …, m) have to be calculated. 
For minimizing this effort, a stepwise approach is chosen. If a screening approach provides 
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the result of fij exceeding a specific threshold a detailed analysis is carried out for estimating 
fij considering all the available information and data. A threshold value of 1.0 0E-07/ry has 
been used for the Fire PSA for full power modes. 
First, each compartment is analyzed with respect to fire specific aspects. If this analysis gives 
the result that no fire impairing nuclear safety can occur under the boundary conditions of 
plant mode being analyzed the compartment can be excluded from further analysis for this 
mode. This corresponds i.e. to the German fire load criterion of screening out compartments 
with a fire load density of less than 90 MJ/m2 provided in (FAK PSA, 2005a). 
For estimating the fire-induced core damage frequency fij for a specific compartment i and a 
plant mode j the compartment inventory as well as that of adjacent ones must be analyzed 
with respect to fire specific aspects and to the safety significance of the inventory. The 
potential fire event sequence can be analyzed by several fire scenarios with {source a, target 
z}, where the fire source a is located inside the fire compartment i to be analyzed, while the 
critical target z can be located in the same compartment i or in the adjacent ones. The fire-
induced CDF fij is calculated corresponding to Figure 1 (Röwekamp et al, 2010). fij is the sum 
of all the critical fire scenarios with {source a, target z} identified for the compartment i and 
plant state j. In this context, a scenario is called a critical one if the target is an item, for 
which its failure causes an initiating event or which itself is a safety related component. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Scheme for estimation of fij for compartment i and plant mode j 
 
Some simplifications are particularly applied for a conservative estimate iˆjf  of ijf (cf. Figure 
1). One assumptions is that a fire inside a compartment i impairs the entire equipment in 
this compartment. Another one is that no fire source a is specified in the compartment i.  
As a result, the fire occurrence frequency of the compartment i is used for calculating iˆjf .  
Table 2 provides the characteristic parameters needed for determining for a given fire 
sequence {a,z} the fire induced CDF as well as the steps of the analysis for which they are 
Fire specific analysis  
of compartment i  
and plant operational state j  
applying given criteria 
Compartment i is screened out;  
fire during plant operational 
state j provides no contribution 
to FCDF;  
0ijf  is set. 
Pessimistic estimate ijfˆ   of ijf  Conservative estimate ijfˆ  is 
below a given threshold value;  
it is not necessary to consider 
compartment i for plant 
operational state j;  
ijij ff ˆ  
is set. 
A detailed analysis has to be carried 
out for the compartment i for the plant 
operational state j for calculating ijf  
 
needed. This information is typically used in the frame determining fij for those scenarios 
not screened out before (cf. Figure 1, detailed analysis). 
 
Characteristic Parameters Analysis 
a fire source 
Selection of a fire scenario with {source a,  
target z} in a compartment to be analyzed 
z fire target: A fire at the 
source a endangers 
equipment z.  
fa Fire occurrence 
frequency of fire source a Calculation of fa  
pz / a Conditional failure 
probability for target z 
due to fire at source a 
Estimation of pz / a by deriving and quantifying a 
fire specific event tree considering all aspects of 
fire suppression 
fz / a Failure frequency of 
target z due to fire at 
source a 
azaaz pff //   
IE Initiating event (IE) due 
to failure or damage of 
target z 
Estimation of IE depends on plant operational 
state to be analyzed; if the failure of target z 
does not result in an IE (z is safety related 
component), experts make a conservative 
assumption corresponding to approach given in 
the plant operating manual. 
pIE/z Conditional occurrence 
probability of initiating 
event (IE) due to failure 
of target z  
In many cases, estimation of pIE / z by expert 
judgment (simplified assumption: only one 
initiating event (IE) possible in case of target z 
failure) 
fIE / z Occurrence frequency of 
an initiating event IE due 
to a fire at fire source a  
zIEazazIEazzIE ppfpff /////   
pSYS / IE  Conditional failure 
probability of safety 
functions required for 
control of the initiating 
event IE  
Estimation of pSYS / IE by deriving and 
quantifying the systems specific event tree for 
control of the initiating event (IE); depending 
on the plant operational state to be analyzed the 
analyst can fall back to event sequences of the 
Level 1 PSA for full power as well as for low 
power and shutdown states; if target z is a 
safety related component, its failure has to be 
considered in the PSA plant model. 
},{ zaf  CDF for a fire at source a with target z IESYSzIEazaza pppff ///},{   
Table 2. Scheme and parameters for estimating fire induced damage frequency { , }a zf for a 
given plant state 
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the result of fij exceeding a specific threshold a detailed analysis is carried out for estimating 
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with a fire load density of less than 90 MJ/m2 provided in (FAK PSA, 2005a). 
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needed. This information is typically used in the frame determining fij for those scenarios 
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3.2. Screening analysis as described in the full power operation PSA documents for 
PSR 
The screening process to identify critical fire compartments is an important first step within 
fire risk assessment. Such a screening analysis should not be too conservative so that an 
unmanageable number of fire scenarios remains for the detailed quantitative analysis. 
However, it must be ensured that all areas relevant for nuclear safety are investigated 
within the quantitative analysis. 
The recent German documents on PSA methods (FAK PSA, 2005a) and PSA data (FAK PSA, 
2005b) do only cover approaches for a Level 1 Fire PSA for full power operation. According 
to (FAK PSA, 2005a and 2005b), the systematic check of the entire plant compartments 
and/or compartment pairs can be performed in two different ways: Critical fire 
compartments can be identified within the frame of a qualitative (qualitative screening) or a 
quantitative process (screening by frequency). The qualitative screening allows - due to the 
introduction of appropriate selection criteria - the determination of critical fire 
compartments with a limited effort. Applying the screening by frequency, critical fire 
compartments are identified by means of a simplified event tree analysis.  
The systematic analysis of all plant compartments and/or compartment pairs requires 
detailed knowledge of the plant specific situation. 
 
3.3 Plant partitioning analysis 
3.3.1 General approach 
It is the task of a Fire PSA to determine and to assess fire induced plant hazard states or 
plant core damage states for the NPP. A plant hazard state (HS) occurs if the required safety 
functions fail. A core damage state (CDS) occurs, if also intended accident management 
measures fail. 
In the following, the recent German Fire PSA methodology (Türschmann et al., 2005) is 
explained for deriving fire induced core damage frequencies. An analogous approach is 
applied for obtaining fire induced plant hazard state frequencies. 
For determining fire induced CDF it is in principle necessary to identify all those 
permanently as well as temporarily present combustibles (fire loads) in the plant, for which 
by any potential ignition a fire impairing nuclear safety is possible. For quantification of the 
consequences the annual combustible specific fa has to be determined for each fire load a 
being present. The fire induced CDF of the entire NPP is derived from the sum of  fa related 
to the entity of combustibles present. In practice, it is impossible to determine the fa for each 
combustible being present in a plant. Therefore, several combustibles are grouped in an 
appropriate manner, i.e. locally interconnected plant areas, so-called compartments, are 
generated inside the buildings. In case of a partitioning of the entire plant into disjoint 
compartments not overlapping each other the annual FCDF is derived from the sum of all 
compartment related fi1. 
Practical considerations suggest analyzing compartments according to the plant specific 
identification system. Depending on the compartment specific characteristics a different 
partitioning of compartments may be necessary in exceptional cases, e.g.: 
 Compartments with internally implemented fire barriers (e.g. long cable channels, 
cable ducts, etc.); 
 Compartments with cable routes/raceways protected by wraps, coatings, etc. (such a 
cable duct or channel should be understand as compartment itself); 
 
 Extremely large fire compartments (reactor annulus, big halls (e.g. turbine hall), 
staircases, etc.). 
Performing Fire PSA starts by determining the building structures to be analyzed 
(Türschmann et al., 2006). This task requires some sensitivity, insofar as the effort of the 
analytical work can be drastically reduced selecting compartments by engineering 
judgement for the detailed analyses based on the knowledge of the plant in general, of the 
plant’s fire protection in particular and, in addition, of the calculation methods used in the 
Fire PSA.  
A compromise has to be made for the optimum partitioning between the greatest level of 
detail (analysis of each individual fire load) and too little details in the plant partitioning. 
The only requirement to be met is that each fire load considered has to be correlated only to 
one compartment. 
 
3.3.2 Exemplary analysis for a BWR-69 type nuclear power plant in Germany 
Five buildings of the entire NPP have been found to be representative for being analyzed 
within the Level 1 Fire PSA for full power plant states (Röwekamp et al., 2006) exemplarily 
performed for a German BWR-69 type NPP (see Table 3).  
 
Building 
Number of Compartments 
Using identification 
system 
To be analyzed 
Reactor Building 306 351 
Switchgear Building 165 203 
Turbine Building 82 106 
Diesel Building 25 26 
IES Building* 36 42 
total 614 728 
* bunkered independent emergency systems building (IES building) 
Table 3. Spatial partitioning of the buildings relevant for Fire PSA in a BWR type reference 
plant analyzed 
 
The spatial plant partitioning for the plant analyzed is principally based on the given plant 
specific identification system. In a few exceptional cases deviations from this procedure 
have to mentioned, e.g. the subdivision of the very large reactor annulus into quadrants, or 
that of extremely long cable rooms and stairways. Some fire protected (sealed) cable ducts 
(raceways) without compartment numbers have been reassigned. 
The analytical step of the spatial partitioning into compartments and the complexity of the 
following analyses can be simplified if the tasks are carried out building by building. It is 
possible to exclude those buildings from the Fire PSA, for which it can be demonstrated that 
there are no components present, whose fire induced functional failure might impair 
nuclear safety (so-called safety related components). It should be simultaneously checked, if 
a fire in a compartment of such a building has the potential of spreading to any other 
building with safety related components. 
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3.2. Screening analysis as described in the full power operation PSA documents for 
PSR 
The screening process to identify critical fire compartments is an important first step within 
fire risk assessment. Such a screening analysis should not be too conservative so that an 
unmanageable number of fire scenarios remains for the detailed quantitative analysis. 
However, it must be ensured that all areas relevant for nuclear safety are investigated 
within the quantitative analysis. 
The recent German documents on PSA methods (FAK PSA, 2005a) and PSA data (FAK PSA, 
2005b) do only cover approaches for a Level 1 Fire PSA for full power operation. According 
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compartments can be identified within the frame of a qualitative (qualitative screening) or a 
quantitative process (screening by frequency). The qualitative screening allows - due to the 
introduction of appropriate selection criteria - the determination of critical fire 
compartments with a limited effort. Applying the screening by frequency, critical fire 
compartments are identified by means of a simplified event tree analysis.  
The systematic analysis of all plant compartments and/or compartment pairs requires 
detailed knowledge of the plant specific situation. 
 
3.3 Plant partitioning analysis 
3.3.1 General approach 
It is the task of a Fire PSA to determine and to assess fire induced plant hazard states or 
plant core damage states for the NPP. A plant hazard state (HS) occurs if the required safety 
functions fail. A core damage state (CDS) occurs, if also intended accident management 
measures fail. 
In the following, the recent German Fire PSA methodology (Türschmann et al., 2005) is 
explained for deriving fire induced core damage frequencies. An analogous approach is 
applied for obtaining fire induced plant hazard state frequencies. 
For determining fire induced CDF it is in principle necessary to identify all those 
permanently as well as temporarily present combustibles (fire loads) in the plant, for which 
by any potential ignition a fire impairing nuclear safety is possible. For quantification of the 
consequences the annual combustible specific fa has to be determined for each fire load a 
being present. The fire induced CDF of the entire NPP is derived from the sum of  fa related 
to the entity of combustibles present. In practice, it is impossible to determine the fa for each 
combustible being present in a plant. Therefore, several combustibles are grouped in an 
appropriate manner, i.e. locally interconnected plant areas, so-called compartments, are 
generated inside the buildings. In case of a partitioning of the entire plant into disjoint 
compartments not overlapping each other the annual FCDF is derived from the sum of all 
compartment related fi1. 
Practical considerations suggest analyzing compartments according to the plant specific 
identification system. Depending on the compartment specific characteristics a different 
partitioning of compartments may be necessary in exceptional cases, e.g.: 
 Compartments with internally implemented fire barriers (e.g. long cable channels, 
cable ducts, etc.); 
 Compartments with cable routes/raceways protected by wraps, coatings, etc. (such a 
cable duct or channel should be understand as compartment itself); 
 
 Extremely large fire compartments (reactor annulus, big halls (e.g. turbine hall), 
staircases, etc.). 
Performing Fire PSA starts by determining the building structures to be analyzed 
(Türschmann et al., 2006). This task requires some sensitivity, insofar as the effort of the 
analytical work can be drastically reduced selecting compartments by engineering 
judgement for the detailed analyses based on the knowledge of the plant in general, of the 
plant’s fire protection in particular and, in addition, of the calculation methods used in the 
Fire PSA.  
A compromise has to be made for the optimum partitioning between the greatest level of 
detail (analysis of each individual fire load) and too little details in the plant partitioning. 
The only requirement to be met is that each fire load considered has to be correlated only to 
one compartment. 
 
3.3.2 Exemplary analysis for a BWR-69 type nuclear power plant in Germany 
Five buildings of the entire NPP have been found to be representative for being analyzed 
within the Level 1 Fire PSA for full power plant states (Röwekamp et al., 2006) exemplarily 
performed for a German BWR-69 type NPP (see Table 3).  
 
Building 
Number of Compartments 
Using identification 
system 
To be analyzed 
Reactor Building 306 351 
Switchgear Building 165 203 
Turbine Building 82 106 
Diesel Building 25 26 
IES Building* 36 42 
total 614 728 
* bunkered independent emergency systems building (IES building) 
Table 3. Spatial partitioning of the buildings relevant for Fire PSA in a BWR type reference 
plant analyzed 
 
The spatial plant partitioning for the plant analyzed is principally based on the given plant 
specific identification system. In a few exceptional cases deviations from this procedure 
have to mentioned, e.g. the subdivision of the very large reactor annulus into quadrants, or 
that of extremely long cable rooms and stairways. Some fire protected (sealed) cable ducts 
(raceways) without compartment numbers have been reassigned. 
The analytical step of the spatial partitioning into compartments and the complexity of the 
following analyses can be simplified if the tasks are carried out building by building. It is 
possible to exclude those buildings from the Fire PSA, for which it can be demonstrated that 
there are no components present, whose fire induced functional failure might impair 
nuclear safety (so-called safety related components). It should be simultaneously checked, if 
a fire in a compartment of such a building has the potential of spreading to any other 
building with safety related components. 
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The partitioning of the NPP into compartments is an important step in performing a Fire 
PSA. In the frame of this step of the analysis it is the major task to make available all the 
data and information necessary to calculate the compartment related fij.  
 
3.4 Fire PSA database 
For performing a quantitative fire risk assessment, a comprehensive database must be 
established which should, e.g., include initiating frequencies, reliability data for all active 
fire protection means, details on fire barriers and their elements, etc. Detailed information is 
needed on potential ignition sources, fire detection and extinguishing systems, and manual 
fire fighting capabilities including the operational fire protection (fire brigade, etc,). Further 
information on secondary fire effects, safety consequences, analysis of the root cause of the 
event and corrective measures, etc. would be helpful. It should be pointed out that plant 
specific data are to be applied as far as feasible. However, generic reliability data have been 
provided as an additional input (Berg & Röwekamp, 2000).  
The database for performing a Fire PSA is developed based on a partitioning of all the buildings 
to be analyzed. Basis for the building selection is the entire nuclear power plant. 
In particular, the following four questions have to be answered by means of the collected data: 
(1) Can an initial incipient fire (“pilot fire”) develop to a fully developed fire spreading all 
over the compartment? 
(2) Which damage can be caused by a fire inside the compartment? 
(3) Is fire spreading/propagation to adjacent compartments possible? 
(4) How can damage of components by the fire and its effects be prevented? 
Question (1) mainly concerns the type and amount of combustibles present inside the 
compartment and their protection (e.g. protective coatings and wraps for cables, enclosures 
of combustible lubricants, fuels, charcoal, etc.). Based on these data, the compartment 
specific fire load density (fire load per compartment floor size) can be estimated. Only in 
case of ignition a fire occurs. Therefore, the entity of the potentially permanently or 
temporarily available ignition sources (e.g. staff attendance frequency, availability of hot 
surfaces, amount of mechanical and electrical equipment present) in the compartment have 
to be compiled for answering question (1). 
The answer to question (2) mainly depends on the inventory of the compartment. That 
means there must be an allocation of the entire compartment inventory (components and 
equipment including cables) to the corresponding compartments. The required equipment 
functions as well as the potential consequences of their failure or malfunction have to be 
known. The inventory has to be classified. Distinguishing between important safety related 
equipment (so-called PSA components) and equipment, for which their failure results in a 
transient or an initiating event (so-called IE components) is necessary. 
For answering question (3) the entire building structures of the NPP must be included in the 
database. For each compartment, the fire compartment boundaries (fire barriers such as 
walls, ceilings, floors including all the fire barrier elements, e.g. doors and dampers) as well 
as the connections between compartments (e.g. doors, hatches, ventilation ducts, cable 
raceways and their attributes) have to be known and documented. In this context, it has to 
be ensured that the questions (1) and (2) cannot only be answered for the compartment 
being analyzed but also for the entity of compartments adjacent to it. 
Question (4) – to what extent damage by fire can be prevented – can only be answered based 
on information about the fire protection features being implemented in the initial fire 
 
compartment itself and its adjacent compartments. This concerns all the potential means for 
fire detection and alarm a well as for fire suppression. 
The Fire PSA database must meet the following requirements: 
 Provision and compilation of compartment related primary data for all compartments 
in the entire NPP necessary to answer the questions (1) to (4); 
 Compilation of data and information such as list of inventory or generation of sets of 
compartments applying different criteria (e.g. accumulation of compartments being 
openly connected to each other); 
 Derivation of compartment specific characteristics such as fire load density, fire 
occurrence frequency or fire spreading probability from one compartment to another 
based on the primary data for calculating fi j  (see 3.6 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Fire PSA Database from (Röwekamp et al., 2010) 
 
Such a database enables a flexible overview and examination of the primary data available 
and guarantees the traceability of the Fire PSA analyses.  
The basic structure of the Fire PSA database as well as some important input and output 
parameters are depicted in Figure 2.  
The database is composed of two databases, the database <INVENTORY> containing the 
data on the compartment specific inventory, and a database <FIRE> containing for each 
compartment all the needed compartment related fire specific information.  
 
3.5 Simplified fire effects analysis within the screening by standardized fire simulations 
The actual Fire PSA enhancements also aim on developing an approach for applying 
standardized fire simulations by means of relatively simple, publicly available zone models 
such as CFAST. 
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The partitioning of the NPP into compartments is an important step in performing a Fire 
PSA. In the frame of this step of the analysis it is the major task to make available all the 
data and information necessary to calculate the compartment related fij.  
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on information about the fire protection features being implemented in the initial fire 
 
compartment itself and its adjacent compartments. This concerns all the potential means for 
fire detection and alarm a well as for fire suppression. 
The Fire PSA database must meet the following requirements: 
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In this approach, which still has to be validated for a complete application, generalized basic 
scenarios, so-called cases and sub-cases, have been defined in a first step for representative 
compartments and their characteristics with the corresponding dependencies of those 
parameters affecting the fire event sequence and the fire consequences significantly. As a 
second analytical step, each fire event sequence has been characterized by means of so-
called design fires carrying different input parameter including standardized time 
sequences and heat release rates taking into account the combustibles typically available.  
In this context, the significant parameters for binning of standard compartments to groups 
are floor size, room height, fire load and/or fire load density, natural and forced ventilation 
conditions, as well as the type of fire. An example of different standard cases is given in 
(Frey et al., 2008; Röwekamp et al., 2008). 
For a set of characteristic fire compartments standardized fire simulations with CFAST have 
been successfully carried out. For automating these simulations, specific program modules 
and interfaces for handling the input and output data as well as information retrievals are 
needed. The main components for the automation are presented in Table 4 and Figure 3.  
 
Fig. 3. Approach for automated standard fire simulations with CFAST from (Frey et al., 2008) 
 
Module Meaning / Task 
GRS DB Containing the geometric and fire related information on compartments in a 
MS ACCESS® database 
allpar.xml Alternative to the database containing all input data (XML format) needed für 
CFAST simulations 
DBInterface Interface for using data from alternative data sources 
XMLInterface Converting XML structure and the data included in the allpar.xml file to a C++-
class; alternative to the direct data transfer by the DBInterface  
GetData Method oriented interface for sampling data stored in ReadXML and mapping 
them in a class structure  
 
Module Meaning / Task 
MakeFire Estimating the parameters of a standardized HRR course using information 
from allpar.xml and storing them in a class / object 
CreateFireFile Creating the CFAST for the fire target Fire.o  
CreateCFastInputF
ile 
Writing the CFAST input file CFast.in by means of the GetData data structure 
Fire.o Fire object imported by the CFAST application 
CFast.in Containing all data on fire compartment, fire barriers, ventilations and systems 
engineering 
CFast Program logic starting the CFAST simulation 
ReadData Reading out time dependent output (e.g. hot gas temperatures)from the CFAST-
output file cfast.n.csv storing them in an adequate class 
ProcessData Assessing the output data imported by ReadData depending on the program 
logic by means of criteria (e.g. effects on safety significant targets) 
Simple.erg Output text file E for process control in case of performing a Monte Carlo 
simulation; solving problem oriented equations for limiting states for being able 
to assess the effects of different parameters on safety significant targets 
Complex.txt Output text file for all simulation results for further processing and use of time 
dependent sequences of the individual simulations 
MCSim (iBMB) Generating user defined discrete random variables for Monte Carlo simulations 
and evaluating the distribution function of the output values providing mean 
values and standard deviations and the resulting safety margin β  
Varpar.txt Data file created by MCSim containing random values for those parameters, 
defined as ’stochastic’ ones in the input file allpar.xml 
GUI Grafic User Interface for calculations´ control  
Table 4. Modules for automated standardized CFAST fire simulations from (Frey et al., 2008) 
 
In this context, it has to be mentioned that a probabilistic calculation for individual 
compartments is possible, if distributions for single parameters can be provided.  
 
3.6 Stepwise compartment fire analysis 
Based on the data and information contained in the database (see 3.4), the fire induced core 
damage frequency fij has to be determined for each compartment i and each plant mode j 
(see Figure 1).  
In the frame of an exemplary Fire PSA performed for a BWR-69 type NPP, in total 351 
compartments are analyzed within the reactor building. For 287 compartments the fire load 
density is less than 90 MJ/m2. For all of the remaining compartments the frequencies of fire 
induced plant hazard states are pessimistically estimated. The sum of the estimated 
frequencies for 64 compartments equals 2.3 E-03/a. For 28 compartments, this frequency 
exceeds 1.0 E-07/a. The sum of the frequencies for the entire compartments with a very 
small frequency value is equal 2.5 E-07/a so that the frequency value for the 28 
compartments covers more than 99 % of the sum of all pessimistically estimated frequency 
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been successfully carried out. For automating these simulations, specific program modules 
and interfaces for handling the input and output data as well as information retrievals are 
needed. The main components for the automation are presented in Table 4 and Figure 3.  
 
Fig. 3. Approach for automated standard fire simulations with CFAST from (Frey et al., 2008) 
 
Module Meaning / Task 
GRS DB Containing the geometric and fire related information on compartments in a 
MS ACCESS® database 
allpar.xml Alternative to the database containing all input data (XML format) needed für 
CFAST simulations 
DBInterface Interface for using data from alternative data sources 
XMLInterface Converting XML structure and the data included in the allpar.xml file to a C++-
class; alternative to the direct data transfer by the DBInterface  
GetData Method oriented interface for sampling data stored in ReadXML and mapping 
them in a class structure  
 
Module Meaning / Task 
MakeFire Estimating the parameters of a standardized HRR course using information 
from allpar.xml and storing them in a class / object 
CreateFireFile Creating the CFAST for the fire target Fire.o  
CreateCFastInputF
ile 
Writing the CFAST input file CFast.in by means of the GetData data structure 
Fire.o Fire object imported by the CFAST application 
CFast.in Containing all data on fire compartment, fire barriers, ventilations and systems 
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ProcessData Assessing the output data imported by ReadData depending on the program 
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Simple.erg Output text file E for process control in case of performing a Monte Carlo 
simulation; solving problem oriented equations for limiting states for being able 
to assess the effects of different parameters on safety significant targets 
Complex.txt Output text file for all simulation results for further processing and use of time 
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values and standard deviations and the resulting safety margin β  
Varpar.txt Data file created by MCSim containing random values for those parameters, 
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In this context, it has to be mentioned that a probabilistic calculation for individual 
compartments is possible, if distributions for single parameters can be provided.  
 
3.6 Stepwise compartment fire analysis 
Based on the data and information contained in the database (see 3.4), the fire induced core 
damage frequency fij has to be determined for each compartment i and each plant mode j 
(see Figure 1).  
In the frame of an exemplary Fire PSA performed for a BWR-69 type NPP, in total 351 
compartments are analyzed within the reactor building. For 287 compartments the fire load 
density is less than 90 MJ/m2. For all of the remaining compartments the frequencies of fire 
induced plant hazard states are pessimistically estimated. The sum of the estimated 
frequencies for 64 compartments equals 2.3 E-03/a. For 28 compartments, this frequency 
exceeds 1.0 E-07/a. The sum of the frequencies for the entire compartments with a very 
small frequency value is equal 2.5 E-07/a so that the frequency value for the 28 
compartments covers more than 99 % of the sum of all pessimistically estimated frequency 
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values. Finally, the frequency of fire induced plant hazard states of the reactor building is 
estimated to be 3.8 E-06/a. This is the result of summarizing the plant hazard state by fire 
for all the 28 compartments. Considering accident management measures the reactor 
building fire induced core damage frequency is estimated to 7.8 E-07/a for the reference 
plant. 
 
3.7 Frequency calculation for fire induced core damage states 
The in 3.4 mentioned necessary classification of the entity components of the NPP is 
extremely time-consuming in the run-up of estimating the fire induced CDF. As mentioned 
before, in particular, two classes of components have to be distinguished being significant: 
 A component is called IE-component, if its failure alone or together with additional 
failures of other components has got the potential to be an initiating event (IE). 
 A component is called a PSA-component, if its failure is regarded as a basic event in 
the fault trees of the corresponding Level 1 internal events PSA.  
Depending on the fire growth a fire event may cause damage. The extent of the damage is 
characterised by the set of components affected/impaired. By means of assessing the extent 
of damage, in particular affecting IE components, it can be found, in how far the fire 
induced core damage may induce an initiating event (IE) modelled in the Level 1 internal 
events PSA. 
The compartment related fire induced frequency of core damage states fij results from the 
product of 
 the fire induced IE frequency and 
 the unavailability of system functions required to control the adverse effects of the 
corresponding IE.  
The unavailability of the required system functions is calculated by means of the Level 1 
internal events PSA plant model taking into consideration the failures of the components 
from the set of components affected by fire. 
 
 Fig. 4. Estimation und calculation of fij  
 
The GRS code CRAVEX is applied for determining those components failed by the fire and 
its effects and their failure probabilities, in order to perform these analyses in an as far as 
practicable automatic manner. CRAVEX combines the fire specific and compartment specific 
data for determining the fire induced component failures and the PSA models for estimating 
core damage frequencies. It supplements the screening process as well as the detailed 
analyses, because the event and fault trees contained in these models describe in detail the 
interconnection between component failures and the occurrence of damage states. The 
following input data are generated by means of the database (see Figure 1): compartment 
specific fire occurrence frequencies, all probabilities of fire propagation to adjacent 
compartments, and the inventory list of all compartments affected by fire.  
Furthermore, compartment related fij can be estimated by CRAVEX (see Figure 4). The Level 
1 internal events PSA plant model and the fire induced component failure probabilities are 
used as input data for the calculations. The approach of these calculations by CRAVEX is in 
principle depicted in Figure 5 for an individual fire scenario. The fire occurrence is assumed 
inside a compartment Ci with i = 1, … , N. 
The Level 1 internal events PSA plant model and the fire induced component failure 
probabilities are used as input data for the calculations. 
 
 Fig. 5. Compartment configuration with fire source, components, and propagation paths 
 
3.7.1 Frequency estimation (pessimistic estimate) 
The following assumptions are made for pessimistic estimations: 
 All active functions of the components in the compartments affected by fire are failed. 
This is considered for the initial fire compartment as well as for all the compartments, 
to where the fire may propagate. 
 The fire occurrence frequencies are known for each compartment. The compartment 
specific fire occurrence frequencies are determined by means of the Berry method 
(Berry, 1979). The building fire frequencies needed as input for calculating 
compartments specific frequencies are estimated plant specifically. 
 The so-called fire propagation probability is a pessimistic estimate of the probability of 
a fire propagating from a given compartment to an adjacent one. The fire propagation 
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3.7.1 Frequency estimation (pessimistic estimate) 
The following assumptions are made for pessimistic estimations: 
 All active functions of the components in the compartments affected by fire are failed. 
This is considered for the initial fire compartment as well as for all the compartments, 
to where the fire may propagate. 
 The fire occurrence frequencies are known for each compartment. The compartment 
specific fire occurrence frequencies are determined by means of the Berry method 
(Berry, 1979). The building fire frequencies needed as input for calculating 
compartments specific frequencies are estimated plant specifically. 
 The so-called fire propagation probability is a pessimistic estimate of the probability of 
a fire propagating from a given compartment to an adjacent one. The fire propagation 
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probabilities are automatically calculated for each pair of adjacent compartments 
applying pessimistic assumptions for the unavailability of fire detection and 
suppression as well as for the fire barriers separating compartments. 
For estimating the compartment specific fire induced CDF it is additionally assumed that 
the active component functions fail corresponding to the fire occurrence frequency of the 
initial fire compartment, where the fire started, that means that the possibilities of fire 
detection and suppression are neglected. 
 
3.7.2 Frequency calculation in detail 
For a detailed quantification, the pessimistic assumptions used by the estimation have to be 
verified and possibly corrected taking into consideration detailed plant specific information 
as explained earlier.  
The realistic assessment of the fire induced damage frequencies is very important. For this 
assessment, fire specific event trees are developed and quantified. The development of fire 
specific event trees for compartments requires knowledge on the plant specific fire 
protection such as: 
 Equipment including fire protection features (e.g. fire detection and alarm features, fire 
extinguishing means, fire barriers and their elements), arrangement of combustibles, 
presence and type of potential ignition sources inside the initial fire compartment and 
adjacent compartments; 
 Verification of possible fire sources in the compartments; 
 Examination of the fire occurrence frequency roughly estimated by means of the 
method of Berry based on the information concerning compartment inventory and the 
compartment characteristics (replacing the application of the more generic top-down-
method within the screening by a bottom-up approach for estimating as far as possible 
realistic compartment specific frequencies); 
 Plant specific unavailability of fire protection equipment in the compartments; 
 Analysis of human behaviour and performance in case of fire; 
 Using results of existing fire simulations or – in difficult cases - performing additional 
calculations for the compartment under consideration. 
The reactor building of the reference plant having been analyzed consists of 351 
compartments, among them 47 compartments on the building level 01. In 15 of the above 
mentioned 47 compartments the fire load density exceeds the threshold value of 90 MJ/m2 
during full power operational plant states. The analysis of possible compartment related fire 
damages gives the result that important PSA related components are present in 12 of the 15 
compartments so that a fire in these compartments will cause an IE. The identified transients 
are exclusively transients induced by cable failures (e.g. by erroneous signals or failures of 
the power supply of solenoid valves of the main steam isolation valves). The fire related 
PSA component failures are taken into account when calculating compartment specific fire 
induced CDF. The fire induced core damage frequency is revealed from a possibly modified 
fire occurrence frequency taking into consideration fire extinguishing means. 
 
4. Potential Improvements 
The fire occurrence frequencies directly affecting the finally resulting core damage 
frequencies have been determined based on realistic and as far as practicable plant specific 
 
data. In principle, the results of the approach of Berry (Berry, 1979) have been used for 
estimating the fire occurrence frequencies. This methodology compares compartments 
within a building to each other with respect to the potential for ignition. Based on the fire 
frequency for the total building compartment specific frequencies are estimated. Depending 
on the amount if data used for calculating the building specific fire frequency the approach 
is more or less conservative.  
Taking also the plant specific operating experience on all incipient fires into account as far as 
possible realistic fire frequencies can be estimated. For the reactor building of the reference 
plant this resulted in a relatively high fire occurrence frequency of 1.6 E-01/a in comparison 
to that of a Fire PSA for another NPP applying only generic data (6.9 E-03/a). Furthermore, 
all possibilities of fire propagation from the initial compartment to adjacent ones and to 
further compartments have been considered. By this systematic approach it could be 
demonstrated that fire propagation is less important for the probability of fire induced 
initiating events and the unavailability of system functions. 
The Level 1 FP Fire PSA having been performed for the reference plant resulted in a fire 
induced CDF of 1.9 E-06/a. This value is higher than the CDF value of 1.4 E-06/a for 
internal events in case of full power operational states. Approx. 69 % of the CDF result from 
fires inside the reactor building, while fires in the auxiliary building provide a contribution 
of approx. 17 %. 
The compartment based Fire PSA uses the assumption that in case of fire non-suppression 
all equipment including cables inside the fire compartment will fail. In case of applying this 
methodology to cable channels the approach may be too conservative. Depending on the 
protection of the channels these have to be treated as separate sub-compartments. The 
results of the Fire PSA may be optimized by systematically checking if protected cable 
channels have been treated correctly. 
For the plant under consideration, the Fire PSA provided some recommendations for 
improving the fire protection: In a few cable channels in the auxiliary building and the 
independent emergency systems building no fire detectors are installed. An early fire 
detection and suppression cannot be ensured. The frequency of an incipient fire for these 
channels is the same as the fire induced damage frequency. On the other hand, the fire 
occurrence frequencies estimated are too pessimistic. In conclusion, the installation of 
automatic fire detectors in these compartments will reduce the compartment specific fire 
induced damage frequency. 
Similar improvements can be performed in specific compartments inside the reactor 
building. The installation of fire detector chains with 2 - 4 fire detectors in compartments for 
the pre-heaters, an installation stairwell, a room with a control board for the safety valves, 
and other process rooms will significantly reduce the compartment specific CDF. 
The fire load density of the compartment for the additional water supply vessel inside the 
reactor building has been treated quite pessimistically. The plant documentation provided a 
fire load of 560 MJ resulting in a fire load density significantly lower than the threshold 
value of 90 MJ/m2 for the compartment floor size of approx. 50 m2. However, the 
compartment has been included in the analysis due to the permanently as well as 
temporarily available fire loads. Here again, the core damage frequency may be reduced by 
installation of more suitable fire detection features or by reducing the fire loads. 
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probabilities are automatically calculated for each pair of adjacent compartments 
applying pessimistic assumptions for the unavailability of fire detection and 
suppression as well as for the fire barriers separating compartments. 
For estimating the compartment specific fire induced CDF it is additionally assumed that 
the active component functions fail corresponding to the fire occurrence frequency of the 
initial fire compartment, where the fire started, that means that the possibilities of fire 
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all equipment including cables inside the fire compartment will fail. In case of applying this 
methodology to cable channels the approach may be too conservative. Depending on the 
protection of the channels these have to be treated as separate sub-compartments. The 
results of the Fire PSA may be optimized by systematically checking if protected cable 
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independent emergency systems building no fire detectors are installed. An early fire 
detection and suppression cannot be ensured. The frequency of an incipient fire for these 
channels is the same as the fire induced damage frequency. On the other hand, the fire 
occurrence frequencies estimated are too pessimistic. In conclusion, the installation of 
automatic fire detectors in these compartments will reduce the compartment specific fire 
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Similar improvements can be performed in specific compartments inside the reactor 
building. The installation of fire detector chains with 2 - 4 fire detectors in compartments for 
the pre-heaters, an installation stairwell, a room with a control board for the safety valves, 
and other process rooms will significantly reduce the compartment specific CDF. 
The fire load density of the compartment for the additional water supply vessel inside the 
reactor building has been treated quite pessimistically. The plant documentation provided a 
fire load of 560 MJ resulting in a fire load density significantly lower than the threshold 
value of 90 MJ/m2 for the compartment floor size of approx. 50 m2. However, the 
compartment has been included in the analysis due to the permanently as well as 
temporarily available fire loads. Here again, the core damage frequency may be reduced by 
installation of more suitable fire detection features or by reducing the fire loads. 
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5. Specific Consideration for Low Power and Shutdown States 
5.1 Differences in the approach for power operation and shutdown states 
As explained earlier, the recent German approach for Fire PSA contains the following steps 
of the analysis: 
 A systematic plant partitioning of the entire plant, and 
 An as far as necessary detailed estimation of FCDF for each of the compartments. 
 
Working step Differences between power operation and 
shutdown states 
1. Plant partitioning 
1.1.Selection of buildings Building selection by classified inventory lists (PSA 
and IE components); different amount of PSA and IE 
components can lead to different buildings to be 
analyzed 
1.2. Building partitioning Partitioning mainly due to given building structures 
with fire specific aspects being considered; plant state 
does not make significant difference 
2, Estimation of fire induced damage state frequencies per compartment and plant 
operational state 
2.1. Fire occurrence frequency Estimation of the fire occurrence frequency by Berry 
methodology is the same for differing plant 
operational states, but the input data are different 
2.2. Fire damage frequency Same methodology for fire damage frequency 
calculation, but differing database for different plant 
operational states 
2.3. Core damage frequency The corresponding PSA plant models for Level 1 PSA 
for power operation and shutdown states are applied; 
for low power and shutdown states it is important if 
and in which detail human actions can be performed. 
Table 5. Analytical steps of a Fire PSA for power operation and shutdown states 
(Röwekamp et al., 2010) 
 
When further sub-dividing these analytical steps some differences in the approach for 
power operation and shutdown states become visible (see Table 5).  
The analyses for German NPP have demonstrated that it has to be considered in the 
estimation of compartment specific fire occurrence frequencies for LP/SD that there 
temporarily fire loads being present and that maintenance and repair work is particularly 
performed in those plant areas and compartments being isolated. This may result in a 
change of the compartment specific fire occurrence frequencies. However, the probability of 
relevant fire induced damage in an isolated compartment is low, as - with only very few 
exceptions - initiating events do not occur in such compartments and safety functions 
remain available. 
 
5.2 Specific considerations for screening 
The first working step is a fire specific compartment analysis corresponding to given criteria 
for the given plant operational mode (FP or LP/SD). Up to the time being, a fire load density 
criterion of screening out compartment with fire load densities lower than 90 MJ/m2 is 
applied due to (FAK PSA, 2005a). This criterion resulted from safety demonstrations for 
non-nuclear industrial buildings. For mechanically ventilated compartments in nuclear 
installations it has been demonstrated that a fire in a compartment with a fire load density of 
only 10 MJ/m2 may result in temperatures exceeding 200 C and thus may impair the 
function of sensitive electrical equipment and cables. Ongoing research activities suggest 
replacing this screening criterion in the future by a fire specific qualitative screening 
criterion considering the really in the compartment present ventilation conditions and fire 
propagation velocities applying the fire load density values only for a fire specific ranking of 
compartments.  
During LP/SD so-called transient fire loads and/or additional ignition sources are 
temporarily present in those rooms where these are needed for maintenance and repair 
activities including hot work. This could be demonstrated for the reference NPP by the logs 
from the Fire PSA plant walk-through. For this type of activities specific work permits for 
isolation of systems/components and clearance procedures for the work including hot work 
permits for fire relevant activities corresponding to the plant operating manual including 
specific requirements for the unit control room and shift personnel are needed. All the 
provisions for preparing and performing maintenance and backfitting activities including 
procedures for electrical as well as process engineering isolations of components and 
systems correspond to these work permits. In case of temporary presence of additional 
potential ignition sources and fire loads specific preventive measures are foreseen 
corresponding to the plant fire protection manual, e.g.: 
 Protecting the affected area against sparks from welding, 
 Covering and isolating openings, gaps, slots, grates, etc., 
 Providing additional portable fire extinguishers, 
 Installation of fire watches in case of fire detectors not being active, 
 Ensuring highly effective mechanical ventilation, 
 Limiting gas reservoirs for activities with gas to a daily amount;  
 Eliminating combustibles in the hot work area,  
 Protective covering of combustibles which cannot be eliminated, 
There is no difference between FP and LP/SD plant modes within the compartment 
screening due to the 90 MJ/m2 fire load density criterion. This criterion is only applied for 
deciding if there can be a fire with potentially significant damage in the compartment. By 
inserting transient fire loads during LP/SD states the fire load density may be increased 
exceeding the threshold value of 90 MJ/m2 so that the compartment can no longer be 
screened out. The practical application has demonstrated that this happens only under the 
above mentioned boundary conditions with the corresponding protection measures and 
mainly in those compartments where the most components are isolated during LP/SD. 
However, it is necessary to roughly estimate the change in the compartment fire load 
density. This has to be considered, e.g. in the simulations of the fire sequence. 
Changes in the ignition conditions due to hot work and isolation of electrical systems and 
components play an important role for estimating fire occurrence frequencies. However, it 
has to be discussed (particularly for fire occurrence frequency estimation in the frame of 
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temporarily fire loads being present and that maintenance and repair work is particularly 
performed in those plant areas and compartments being isolated. This may result in a 
change of the compartment specific fire occurrence frequencies. However, the probability of 
relevant fire induced damage in an isolated compartment is low, as - with only very few 
exceptions - initiating events do not occur in such compartments and safety functions 
remain available. 
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The first working step is a fire specific compartment analysis corresponding to given criteria 
for the given plant operational mode (FP or LP/SD). Up to the time being, a fire load density 
criterion of screening out compartment with fire load densities lower than 90 MJ/m2 is 
applied due to (FAK PSA, 2005a). This criterion resulted from safety demonstrations for 
non-nuclear industrial buildings. For mechanically ventilated compartments in nuclear 
installations it has been demonstrated that a fire in a compartment with a fire load density of 
only 10 MJ/m2 may result in temperatures exceeding 200 C and thus may impair the 
function of sensitive electrical equipment and cables. Ongoing research activities suggest 
replacing this screening criterion in the future by a fire specific qualitative screening 
criterion considering the really in the compartment present ventilation conditions and fire 
propagation velocities applying the fire load density values only for a fire specific ranking of 
compartments.  
During LP/SD so-called transient fire loads and/or additional ignition sources are 
temporarily present in those rooms where these are needed for maintenance and repair 
activities including hot work. This could be demonstrated for the reference NPP by the logs 
from the Fire PSA plant walk-through. For this type of activities specific work permits for 
isolation of systems/components and clearance procedures for the work including hot work 
permits for fire relevant activities corresponding to the plant operating manual including 
specific requirements for the unit control room and shift personnel are needed. All the 
provisions for preparing and performing maintenance and backfitting activities including 
procedures for electrical as well as process engineering isolations of components and 
systems correspond to these work permits. In case of temporary presence of additional 
potential ignition sources and fire loads specific preventive measures are foreseen 
corresponding to the plant fire protection manual, e.g.: 
 Protecting the affected area against sparks from welding, 
 Covering and isolating openings, gaps, slots, grates, etc., 
 Providing additional portable fire extinguishers, 
 Installation of fire watches in case of fire detectors not being active, 
 Ensuring highly effective mechanical ventilation, 
 Limiting gas reservoirs for activities with gas to a daily amount;  
 Eliminating combustibles in the hot work area,  
 Protective covering of combustibles which cannot be eliminated, 
There is no difference between FP and LP/SD plant modes within the compartment 
screening due to the 90 MJ/m2 fire load density criterion. This criterion is only applied for 
deciding if there can be a fire with potentially significant damage in the compartment. By 
inserting transient fire loads during LP/SD states the fire load density may be increased 
exceeding the threshold value of 90 MJ/m2 so that the compartment can no longer be 
screened out. The practical application has demonstrated that this happens only under the 
above mentioned boundary conditions with the corresponding protection measures and 
mainly in those compartments where the most components are isolated during LP/SD. 
However, it is necessary to roughly estimate the change in the compartment fire load 
density. This has to be considered, e.g. in the simulations of the fire sequence. 
Changes in the ignition conditions due to hot work and isolation of electrical systems and 
components play an important role for estimating fire occurrence frequencies. However, it 
has to be discussed (particularly for fire occurrence frequency estimation in the frame of 
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screening) if the Berry parameters (Berry, 1979) applied for FP states can also be applied for 
LP/SD states. It has to considered that the prerequisites for the occurrence of an initial 
incipient fire do not change in those compartments not being isolated during LP/SD, while 
for the isolated compartments the consequences have to be balanced. Isolation of electrical 
components reduces the fire risk, hot work increases it.  
In addition, hot work activities correspond to the presence of personnel in the affected 
compartment resulting in an early manual fire detection and suppression. Recent German 
research activities have demonstrated that an evaluation of the hot work permits is 
particularly needed for observing and considering potential peculiarities during these 
activities typically performed during LP/SD from the beginning of the analysis and being 
able to consider those time periods explicitly for the fire occurrence frequency estimation. 
 
5.3 Particular requirements for low power and shutdown states  
The fire protection regulations and standards do not only have to be applied for FP modes 
but also for LP/SD modes, in particular: 
 Control room and shift regulations (part of the plant operating manual), 
 Maintenance rules (part of the plant operating manual), 
 Alarm regulation (part of the plant operating manual), 
 Fire protection regulation (part of the plant operating manual), 
 Fire protection concept, 
 Service instruction concerning tasks, organization, skills, and training, and of the on-
site fire brigade. 
In the following, some aspects significant in particular for LP/SD modes are pointed out. 
During the operation and tripping time period compliance with the following rules for 
minimizing transient fire loads and potential ignition sources is required: 
 Transient fire loads have to be avoided as far as practically possible. 
 All people working on-site are obliged to keep their work places as far as practically 
possible free from combustible materials and/or to eliminate them from these 
materials in the shortest possible time period. 
 Combustible solids, liquids, and gases are only permitted to be present at the work 
place in an amount needed per one shift. 
 Drained vessels no longer in use, formerly filled with combustible liquids have to be 
stored in a special storage room for scrap and lubricants. 
 Handling and treatment of liquid or gaseous combustibles is only permitted under 
given prerequisites and standards specified in the corresponding work order. 
 Hot work (work with open flames, welding, cutting, etc.) requires specific written hot 
work permits before starting the activities. The required necessary protective 
provisions including fire watches and control walk-troughs are explicitly specified in 
the hot work permit. 
 
5.4 Exemplary results for a BWR-69 type nuclear power plant in Germany 
For the BWR-69 type reference plant being analyzed it could be demonstrated that for 
LP/SD plant modes the same six buildings as for FP modes have to be analyzed. The spatial 
partitioning is principally based on the plant specific identification system of the entire NPP. 
In a few exceptional cases there were deviations from this procedure, e.g. the sub-division of 
 
the large reactor annulus into quadrants, or very long cable rooms and stairways. Some fire 
protected (sealed) cable raceways without compartment numbers were reassigned. 
The screening has been performed in the same manner for FP and LP/SD plant modes. In 
this context, it has to be stated that particular differences in the screening of compartments 
result from maintenance and repair activities including hot work. Significant findings have 
not been observed for the plant being analyzed. As an important finding it has to be 
mentioned that many connections between compartments have pessimistically to be 
assumed open during LP/SD, as the activities being performed during these periods often 
create conditions where barriers elements (e.g. doors, cable penetration seals, etc.) are being 
left open or blocked due to practical reasons for the ongoing activities.  
 
Building Plant Operational State 
FP LP/SD 
 No. of 
fires 
Fire 
occurrence 
frequency 
No. of 
fires 
Fire 
occurrence 
frequency 
Reactor Building  
(without Containment) 
   4 1.6 E-01    6 2.4 E-01 
Switchgear Building    8 2.9 E-01    3 1.2 E-01 
Turbine Building    4 1.6 E-01  11 4.0 E-01 
Diesel Building    0 1.7 E-02    0 1.7 E-02 
Independent Emergency 
Systems (IES) Building 
   0 1.7 E-02    0 1.7 E-02 
Other buildings and plant areas 16  15  
Total 32  35  
Table 6. Fire events and occurrence frequencies (expected values) in the reference plant for 
full power and low power / shutdown states 
 
On the other hand, the higher presence of humans during these operational modes in the 
buildings results in early detection of situations which could create a fire and/or a manual 
fire detection and suppression during the incipient fire phase. This may explain the first 
rough results when comparing fire occurrences during FP and LP/SD. In total 67 fire events 
occurred in the reference plant from 1980 (start of commercial operation) to the end of 2008, 
32 of these during FP modes, and 35 during LP/SD modes. Only one of these was reportable 
due to the German reporting criteria, 66 were incipient fire events below the reporting 
thresholds. Table 6 provides the corresponding building specific event distribution and fire 
frequencies (Röwekamp et al., 2010).  
Determining fire occurrence frequencies for LP/SD plant modes the durations of the 
different phases of the operational modes and the frequencies estimated for each phase have 
to be considered. For selected buildings, e.g. the diesel building, there are nearly no 
differences between FP and LP/SD states. In this case, the approach is the same for both 
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work permits before starting the activities. The required necessary protective 
provisions including fire watches and control walk-troughs are explicitly specified in 
the hot work permit. 
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For the BWR-69 type reference plant being analyzed it could be demonstrated that for 
LP/SD plant modes the same six buildings as for FP modes have to be analyzed. The spatial 
partitioning is principally based on the plant specific identification system of the entire NPP. 
In a few exceptional cases there were deviations from this procedure, e.g. the sub-division of 
 
the large reactor annulus into quadrants, or very long cable rooms and stairways. Some fire 
protected (sealed) cable raceways without compartment numbers were reassigned. 
The screening has been performed in the same manner for FP and LP/SD plant modes. In 
this context, it has to be stated that particular differences in the screening of compartments 
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mentioned that many connections between compartments have pessimistically to be 
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left open or blocked due to practical reasons for the ongoing activities.  
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due to the German reporting criteria, 66 were incipient fire events below the reporting 
thresholds. Table 6 provides the corresponding building specific event distribution and fire 
frequencies (Röwekamp et al., 2010).  
Determining fire occurrence frequencies for LP/SD plant modes the durations of the 
different phases of the operational modes and the frequencies estimated for each phase have 
to be considered. For selected buildings, e.g. the diesel building, there are nearly no 
differences between FP and LP/SD states. In this case, the approach is the same for both 
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operational modes. For all the other buildings the approach has to be adjusted to the 
boundary conditions and data stored in the Fire PSA database for this mode. 
 
6. Conclusions and Outlook 
A state-of-the-art methodology for Fire PSA has been developed and successfully applied 
for a German NPP. This methodology is based on a combined multi-step qualitative and 
quantitative screening approach applying a comprehensive database specifically developed 
for the application within the frame of Fire PSA. The approach being applied enables to 
automatically perform several analytical steps of the Fire PSA. Some of the automatisms, e.g. 
the calculation of compartment specific fire occurrence frequencies or the probabilities of 
fire propagation to adjacent and further compartments, have been successfully implemented 
in the database. Standardized input data files have been provided for other applications of 
the Fire PSA database, e.g. for determining fire induced core damage frequencies by means 
of the simulation code CRAVEX. 
Up to now, the Fire PSA database has not yet been completely adapted from full power 
plant modes to low power and shutdown modes. Investigations, which data have to be 
changed or added for these states, are still ongoing.  
Another recent development focuses on fire induced cable failures and circuit faults, which 
are broadly discussed on an international level (EPRI, 2005). In this context, a cable failure 
mode and effect analysis (FMEA) for all the PSA related cables has been developed (Herb & 
Piljugin, 2008) and tested for a fire compartment, which had been identified as significant in 
the frame of the Fire PSA. This leads to the requirement to enlarge the Fire PSA database 
considering additional data needed for a cable FMEA and/or combining the compartment 
inventory matrix with the cable database of the FMEA. The activities for implementation of 
the cable FMEA approach in the Fire PSA methodology are ongoing. 
A further development will cover the characteristics of compartments and components for 
supplementing the automatic data supply, such as data on the room heights for fire 
simulations with the zone model CFAST or the description of the ventilation systems for 
assessing smoke propagation. 
In addition, an uncertainty and sensitivity analysis has been performed for the reference 
plant Fire PSA providing not only mean values for fire induced CDF but also for 
quantifying major uncertainties. This will increase the level of confidence of the Fire PSA  
results. 
It has to be pointed out with respect to the statistical data applied in the frame of an as far as 
possible realistic Fire PSA that the existing national database, in particular data on 
compartment specific as well as component specific fire occurrence frequencies and on the 
reliability of fire protection features, has to be further improved and expanded. Moreover, 
the human influence has to be considered carefully.  
The use of internationally available generic data (e.g. for fire occurrence frequencies), mainly 
from the U.S. and France, is not always appropriate for application within Fire PSA for 
German plants due to differences in design, inspection and maintenance. However, the 
German data being presently available do not always allow providing a verified database 
because only a very small amount of approx. 30  fire events had to be obligatory reported to 
the national supervisory authorities. Therefore, the OECD FIRE Database Project which was 
started by OECD/NEA in 2003 to collect fire event data and meanwhile comprises more 
 
than 340 fire events from twelve NEA member countries (OECD, 2009) may supplement 
performing Fire PSA for German NPP by  further input data.. First test applications of this 
database with up to the end of 2008 in total 343 fire events have been successfully performed 
(Berg et al., 2009; Berg et al., 2010). 
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